The world is currently navigating a period of profound political convulsion, marked by a “third wave of autocratization” that has been building for over 25 years. As of 2024, the number of democracies worldwide has fallen below the number of autocracies for the first time in over two decades, with 72% of the global population now living under autocratic regimes. Within this broader global decline, the relationship between Islam and democracy remains one of the most critical and frequently misunderstood frontiers of political science.
Widespread Support for Democratic Ideals
Despite common Western misconceptions, support for democracy is widespread across predominantly Muslim nations. Surveys of major Muslim publics, including those in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia, reveal that majorities or pluralities prefer democracy over any other form of government. For instance, approximately 81% of Lebanese and 71% of Egyptians express a clear preference for democratic governance.
However, this support is often nuanced by economic realities. When asked to choose between a “good democracy” and a “strong economy,” many publics—particularly in Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia—prioritize economic prosperity and political stability over democratic features. This tension highlights that while the desire for self-governance is high, the functional capacity of the state to provide for its citizens is a primary determinant of regime legitimacy.
The “Turkish Model”: From Kemalism to “Muslim Democracy”
Turkey has long served as the primary laboratory for testing the compatibility of Islamic values with modern statehood. The traditional “Kemalist” model, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, sought to modernize the nation through “assertive secularism,” which aimed to exclude religion from the public sphere and place it under strict state control via the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).
In recent decades, this model has been challenged by the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which describes itself as a “conservative democratic” party. This transition represents the emergence of “Muslim Democracy,” an electoral platform that seeks to integrate Muslim values into broader socioeconomic demands, similar to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. Significant constitutional changes, such as the 2010 amendments, successfully weakened the Kemalist control over the judiciary and military, theoretically deepening democratic control.
Yet, Turkey’s trajectory remains volatile. While the AKP initially drove major EU-inspired reforms, a clear slowdown occurred after 2005. By 2024, indices such as the V-Dem Democracy Report classified Turkey as a “hybrid regime” and a manifest autocratizer, reflecting a broader trend where democratically elected leaders gradually dismantle institutional constraints.
Multiple Secularisms: France, Turkey, and Senegal
The sources emphasize that “secularism” is not a monolithic concept but exists on a continuum.
- Assertive Secularism (France and Turkey): In these states, the government plays an active role in excluding religious symbols from the public sphere, such as the bans on headscarves in public schools or universities.
- Passive Secularism (USA and Senegal): These models allow for the public visibility of religion. Senegal, a 94% Muslim nation, utilizes a “respect all, support all” model, where the state actively assists both Muslim and Catholic pilgrimages and incorporates religious instruction in schools.
The Senegalese case proves that a predominantly Muslim society can successfully coexist with a secular state without the high levels of tension seen in Turkey’s assertive model.
The Rentier State: Oil as a Barrier to Reform
Economic structures also play a decisive role in the survival of democracy. Rentier State Theory (RST) suggests that countries relying on externally generated oil rents, rather than domestic taxation, are less likely to democratize. Because these states do not depend on their citizens for revenue, they often lack extractive bureaucracies and are less sensitive to societal demands for representation.
During the Arab Spring, rentier states like Qatar and the UAE maintained stability by using oil wealth to increase public sector wages and subsidies, effectively “buying” political acquiescence. Conversely, in states where distribution was skewed by regional or tribal favoritism—such as Libya—uprisings were more likely to take root.
The Fragile State of Global Democracy in 2025
The latest data from the V-Dem Democracy Report 2025 paints a stark picture for the future. Liberal democracies are now the least common regime type, hosting less than 12% of the world’s population. We are seeing a rise in “Grey Zone” countries—regimes like Mexico and Nigeria that sit precariously between democracy and autocracy.
Autocratizers today often use a standard “weapon of choice”: media censorship, followed by the repression of civil society and the undermining of election integrity. Alarmingly, freedom of expression is now deteriorating in 44 countries.
Conclusion: The Path Forward
The emergence of “Muslim Democracy” provides a pragmatic model for change by integrating religious identity with democratic participation. The core lesson from the “Turkish Model” and global trends is that democratization is most successful when the state provides rewards for moderation while sanctioning extremist anti-system behavior. As the world grapples with this era of autocratization, the ability to reconcile diverse religious traditions within inclusive, democratic frameworks will remain the defining challenge of the 21st century.