In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter stood before Congress and issued a warning that would define American foreign policy for nearly half a century: any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and repelled by “any means necessary, including military force”. This “Carter Doctrine” was rooted in the existential necessity of petroleum to modern armies and the global economy. Yet, as we navigate the complexities of 2025, a new strategic imperative is emerging. While the ghost of the Carter Doctrine still haunts the Strait of Hormuz—where over 21 million barrels of oil transit daily—the battlefield of national security has shifted from the oil field to the rare earth processing hub.
For decades, U.S. energy statecraft in the Middle East followed a “triadic framework” where material interests established red lines, securitization generated political mandates, and international law was used to legitimize interventions. From the 1990 Gulf War to recent military strikes in Iraq and Syria in June 2025, Washington has repeatedly demonstrated its resolve to protect the flow of hydrocarbons. However, this “oil-centric” focus is being superseded by a more profound vulnerability: a near-total dependency on China for rare earth elements (REEs).
Rare earth elements are the invisible architecture of modern defense. A single F-35 fighter jet requires over 900 pounds of these minerals, while a Virginia-class submarine consumes roughly 9,200 pounds. Beyond the military, they are essential for everything from MRI scanners to electric vehicles and semiconductors. Since 2010, China has demonstrated a willing readiness to weaponize this dominance, imposing export restrictions to obstruct midstream capabilities outside its borders. As of 2023, China still controlled 99 percent of global heavy rare earth (HREE) processing.
The United States is currently pursuing a dual-track approach to break this stranglehold. Domestically, the Department of Defense is investing hundreds of millions of dollars to build a “mine-to-magnet” supply chain, with Texas emerging as a primary hub for processing and magnet manufacturing. Internationally, the U.S. is forging strategic partnerships with “trusted allies” like Australia and Canada, as well as deepening ties with Saudi Arabia. The recent memorandum of understanding between U.S.-based MP Materials and the Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maaden) signals a shift toward a global, integrated rare earth value chain independent of Chinese control.
However, this transition faces significant hurdles within the 2025 geopolitical landscape. The recently published US National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects a turn toward “flexible realism” and “hyper-nationalism,” prioritizing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine that emphasizes Western Hemisphere hegemony. This transactional approach, characterized by the erratic use of tariffs and threats to pull out of trade agreements like CUSMA, risks alienating the very allies—such as Canada and Australia—required to build resilient mineral processing hubs.
Furthermore, the legal and environmental challenges of processing REEs are immense. The industry generates massive amounts of radioactive residue and wastewater, and U.S. projects have already faced delays due to permitting hurdles. To compete with China’s cost-efficiency, the U.S. has introduced innovative policies, such as the Department of Defense’s price floor guarantee for certain magnets, to shield domestic producers from market volatility.
Ultimately, securing the materials of the future requires the same “steady nerves and resolute action” Carter once demanded for the Persian Gulf. The lesson of the last fifty years is that energy security is never just about resources; it is about the power to control the circulatory system of the modern world. To maintain its global primacy, the United States must successfully transition its doctrine from protecting the “oil lifeblood” to securing the technological lifeblood of rare earths. Without swift, coordinated action to build both domestic and international processing hubs, the West will remain dangerously vulnerable to economic coercion and supply disruptions that no amount of naval power in the Strait of Hormuz can solve.